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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case, involving errors made by the trial 
court and the Utah Court of Appeals in the overall valuation and 
distribution of the marital property vis-a-vis Dr. Sorensen's solo 
dental practice, and the requirement that Dr. Sorensen pay a 
portion of Mrs. Sorensen's expert witness fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No addition facts need be set forth in connection with this 
Reply Brief. Dr. Sorensen relies on his Statement of Facts as set 
forth in pages 6 through 17 of his Brief on Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE 
PROPRIETY OF THE DECISION BY THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS UPHOLDING THE VALUATION 
AND DISTRIBUTION OF "GOODWILL" 
ATTRIBUTABLE TO DR. SORENSEN IN HIS SOLO 
PROFESSION PRACTICE AS MARITAL PROPERTY. 
RESPONDENT'S ASSERTION THAT DR. 
SORENSEN DID NOT OBJECT TO THE TRIAL 
COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF "GOODWILL" 
IS INCORRECT 
Respondent claims that Petitioner did not object at trial to 
the issue of goodwill being considered in the valuation of Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice. That simply is not so. Mrs. Sorensen 
called her expert to place a value on the practice. (Vol. I, R 54-
76) During this examination, Dr. Austin testified about his 
written "qualified" opinion as set out on Exhibit "D." (See A-32 
Addendum to Petitioner's Brief.) He was^then cross examined as to 
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how his conclusions relating to value would change if, for example, 
Dr. Sorensen was to become disabled or to retire. (Vol. I, R. 77-
89) At the conclusion of his testimony, Respondent then moved for 
admission of Exhibit "D," to which Petitioner's counsel immediately 
objected. (Vol. I, R. 89) That exhibit and supporting testimony 
was then received by the trial court over Petitioner's timely 
objection. (Vol. I, R. 89). 
Parenthetically, when Dr. Sorensen had an opportunity to 
present his case, his accountant testified that at no time had 
goodwill ever been shown as an asset of the practice. (Vol. I, R. 
32) Mr. Roger Nuttal, a second accountant, disputed inclusion of 
goodwill as an asset of the dental practice. (Vol. II, R. 24) 
Succinctly put, the issue as to whether or not goodwill should 
have been included was presented to the trial court and there was 
a proper objection when the trial court was asked by Mrs. Sorensen 
to consider it. 
L. 
Utah is aligned with those 
jurisdictions which hold that 
"goodwill" of a solo professional 
practice is not to be considered as 
a divisible marital asset 
Mrs. Sorensen contends that the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals' upholding the trial courts' ruling that Dr. Sorensen's 
professional practice has "goodwill" value which is divisible upon 
divorce is in harmony with Utah law and is the favored rule 
elsewhere. This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, it 
certainly is not the law in Utah. Second, while some jurisdictions 
have decided that a professional may possess goodwill to be 
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considered upon divorce, others more correctly reason that it is 
not appropriate to consider the concept of professional goodwill 
as a divisible marital asset. 
1. In Utah, it is improper to value and distribute 
"goodwill" attributable to a professional in solo practice as a 
marital asset. 
In Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P. 2d 667 (Utah 
1966), this court held that "goodwill" is not an element of value 
in a business which depends upon the professional qualities of the 
person who carries it on, specifically stating that: 
It has repeatedly been held there can be 
no "goodwill," so called, of a business which 
depends for its existence upon the professional 
qualities of the person who carry it on. 
Goodwill cannot arise as an asset of a 
partnership where the parties only contribute, 
as capital, their professional skill and 
reputation, however intrinsically valuable 
these may be. [Footnote] 
Id. at 670, 671. (Emphasis added.) 
This holding and the underlying principles set forth by this 
Court in Jackson have not been changed or modified and Jackson is 
still the law in Utah. Where Dr. Sorensen maintains his 
professional practice as a sole practitioner and the continued 
success of that practice is entirely dependent upon his personal 
skills and reputation then, consistent with the Jackson rule, there 
can be no "goodwill" value of his practice to distribute upon 
divorce. To do so, as did the courts below in Sorensen, 82 0 (Utah 
App. 1989) is error and is wrong. 
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The ruling by the court below in Sorensen is an aberration 
entirely inconsistent and not in harmony with Utah's appellate 
court decisions issued subsequent to Jackson which address the 
question of professional "goodwill" as a marital asset. In Dogu 
v. Doau, 552 P.2d 1305, 1309 (Utah 1982), this court implicitly 
held that an individual's earning power as a solo practitioner is 
not divisible asset upon divorce; yet, the Sorensen court did so 
by affirming an approach which valued future earning capacity, 
labeled it as "goodwill" and then awarded that value to Dr. 
Sorensen as a marital "asset." Later, in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) this court recognized that goodwill may be 
a marital asset. There, however, Dr. Gardner was a member of an 
on-going business concern employing twenty-three physicians, the 
continuing success . of which was not dependent entirely on his 
reputation and continuing association; a situation quite different 
from Dr. Sorensen's practice which depended entirely upon Dr. 
Sorensen's personal bills and obligations for its success. Most 
recently, in Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P. 2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) , the 
court reaffirmed the Jackson rule, stating: 
There can be no goodwill in a business that is 
dependent for its existence upon the individual 
who conducts that enterprise and would vanish 
were the individual to die, retire or quit 
work. Jackson v. Caldwell 18 Utah 2d at 86, 
415 P.2d at 670. 
Id. at 946. 
The decisions in DogU/ Gardner and Stevens are in harmony with 
this Court's holding in Jackson; the holding in Sorensen is in 
conflict with existing Utah case law as established by this Court. 
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The principle of stare decisis should have been applied by the 
courts below. Respondent's assertion that other jurisdiction have 
decided the issue of goodwill differently is simply not material 
and avoids the issue as to what is the present law in Utah. 
2. Utah follows the sound approach of her sister states 
which hold that professional "goodwill11 is not a subject for 
consideration in the division of marital property. 
While some jurisdictions have decided that a professional may 
possess goodwill subject to consideration in a divorce action, 
others more correctly reach the opposite conclusion that it is 
inappropriate to consider the concept of professional goodwill as 
a divisible marital asset. Based upon this Court's statement in 
Jackson, supra, and it's most recent statements in Peterson v. 
Peterson, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987), and Rayburn v. Rayburn, 
738 P.2d 238 (Utah App. 1987), pertaining to the non-divisibility 
upon divorce of professional degrees which serve as the basis for 
the income production, Utah follows the latter position and has 
specifically rejected the position urged by Respondent. 
Utah follows her sister states, including Wisconsin, Texas, 
Louisiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee and New York which hold that professional 
goodwill is not a subject for consideration in the division of 
marital property. See Sorensen, supra, 769 P.2d 825. Although 
Respondent argues that such an approach is antiquated, it continues 
to be the subject of contemporary analysis and support. In 
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 309 N.W.2d 343 (Wis.App. 1981), a complete 
copy of which is included in the Addendum to Petitioner's lead 
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Brief, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals concluded that the trial 
court improperly distributed "goodwill" attributable to the 
husband's practice as marital property and it reasoned that the 
more sound analysis was that which has been the law in Utah since 
1966 when Jackson v. Caldwell was decided. In so holding that 
professional goodwill is not a divisible asset, the Wisconsin court 
stated: 
The concept of professional goodwill evanesces 
when one attempts to distinguish it from future 
earning capacity. Although a professional 
business's good reputation, which is 
essentially what its goodwill consists of, is 
certainly a thing of value, we do not believe 
that it bestows on those who have an ownership 
interest in the business, an actual, separate 
property interest. The reputation of a law 
firm or some other professional business is 
valuable to its individual owners to the extent 
that it assures continued substantial earnings 
in the future. It cannot be separately sold 
or pledged by the individual owners. The 
goodwill or reputation of such a business 
accrues to the benefit of the owners only 
through increased salary. 
Hglbrook, Id. at 354. 
Similarly, in Powell v. Powell, 648 P.2d 218 (Kansas 1982), 
the Supreme Court for Kansas held that: 
We are not persuaded a professional practice 
such as Dr. Powell's has a goodwill value. 
The practice is personal to the practitioner. 
When he or she dies or retires nothing remains. 
The professional's files and lists of clients 
are of no use to others. The very nature of 
a professional practice is that it is totally 
dependent upon the professional. We refuse to 
adopt the theory that goodwill in a 
professional practice is an asset subject to 
division in a divorce action. The issue is 
without merit. 
Id. at 223 & 224. 
6 
See also Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) a copy of 
which has been included in the Addendum to Petitioner's lead Brief; 
In Re; Marriage of Wielder, 461 N.E.2d, 447 (111. 1983); Taylor 
v. Taylor, 336 N.W.2d 851 (Neb. 1986); Carter v. Carter, 616 
S.W.2d, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) and Hirschi v. Hirschi, 710 S.W.2d 
942 (Tex. App. El Paso, 1989), DeMasi v. DeMasif 530 A.2d 871 (Pa. 
Super. 1987); Depner v. Depner, 478 So.2d 532 (La. 1985); In Re: 
Courtright, 507 N.E. 2d 891 (111. App. 3 Distr. 1987); Hanson v. 
Hanson, 738 S.W. 2d 429 (Mo. banc 1987); Antolik v. Harvey, 761 
P.2d 305 (Ha. App. 1968); Prahinski v. Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833 (Md. 
App. 1988); Pearce v. Pearce, 482 So.2d 1098 (La. 1986). 
When considered together Holbrook and Powell, supra highlight 
the critical distinction to be made between true goodwill which is 
a saleable asset and professional reputation which is personal to 
the practitioner and indistinguishable from earning capacity. True 
goodwill in a business exists separately from the practitioner and 
is independent of that practitioner's continued involvement in the 
business (see, e.g. Gardner, supra). No "goodwill" separate from 
the practitioner's earning capacity exists, however, where the 
professional's practice would disappear upon that professional's 
immediate withdrawal from practice. This critical distinction 
between true goodwill value and professional reputation is properly 
observed in Utah and her sister states which refuse to consider 
"goodwill" as a marital asset subject to valuation and distribution 
where any such value is attributable to a professional in solo 
practice; it is improperly blurred by those jurisdictions holding 
otherwise. Although this distinction is essentially lost in 
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Respondent's Argument, it was recognized at trial by her expert 
witness, Dr. Austin. His valuation of Dr. Sorensen's solo practice 
assumed that Dr. Sorensen would cooperate and participate in the 
practice during an orderly sale or transfer period. (Tr. Vol. 1 
at 70-76, 83) The necessity of Dr. Sorensen's assistance in any 
transfer of his practice underscores the very personal 
characteristics of his practice and the fact that no value would 
exist independent of Dr. Sorensen1s reputation and willingness to 
continue to lend his good name to practice. 
The decisions of Utah's sister states and our Supreme Court 
in Jackson as well as our Court of Appeals in Stevens, articulate 
the better rule, and in fact the law in Utah, that professional 
goodwill is not an asset subject to valuation and distribution in 
a divorce action. Consequently, the court below erred in placing 
any value whatsoever on the "goodwill" of Dr. Sorensen's dental 
practice and distributing that value as a marital asset. 
THE COURT BELOW ACTED ARBITRARILY AND 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE DISTRIBUTING 
"GOODWILL" ATTRIBUTABLE TO DR. 
SORENSEN IN HIS SOLO PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICE AS A MARITAL ASSET WHERE 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING 
ITS VALUE AT THE TIME OF THE MARRIAGE 
AND THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED 
SHOWED ANY SUCH VALUE TO BE 
PREMARITAL 
Mrs. Sorensen failed to present any evidence at trial 
establishing "goodwill" value attributable to Dr. Sorensenfs 
professional practice (Vol. I, P. 76; Ex. D) at the time of 
marriage. The evidence presented by Dr. Sorensen showed he had 
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maintained a successful solo practice for approximately six years 
before the marriage. At the time of divorce, he had fewer patients 
and greater overhead (Vol. I, P. 288; Vol II, p.88, 121). His 
annual income, after CPI adjustments, was less at the time of trial 
than at the time of the marriage (Vol. II, p. 26-27). These facts 
were not controverted and lead to the inescapable conclusion that 
any "goodwill11 value Dr. Sorensen may have accumulated in his 
practice through his reputation, expertise and client loyalty 
existed prior to the parties1 marriage and, therefore, was separate 
property and should not have been included as marital property. 
Consistent with this court's decision in Preston v. Preston, 649 
P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982), and Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 
304, (Utah 1988), the courts below should have returned any 
goodwill value attributable to Dr. Sorensen in his solo 
professional practice as premarital and separate property. 
Instead, as Judge Jackson in his dissent in Sorensen correctly 
pointed out, the trial court arbitrarily and without evidence 
proportioned this "goodwill" value over the course of the practice, 
and treated a percentage of this "goodwill" as marital property. 
Mrs. Sorensen seeks to sanction this unfair result to her advantage 
overlooking her fatal proof defect in failing to establish what, 
if any, portion of the "goodwill" was accumulated during the 
marriage. 
This inequity should not be condoned and the Court of Appeals 
should not be allowed to so substantially depart from the accepted 
and usual course of judicial proceedings requiring that the trial 
court have before it evidence on the value of an asset as of the 
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date of marriage and the date of trial in order to determine if 
any part of the asset should be treated as marital property. The 
courts below erred and abused their discretion, resulting in 
material unfairness and inequity to Dr. Sorensen which should not 
be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE IN THE VALUATION 
OF DR. SORENSEN»S SOLO PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICE WHILE REQUIRING HIM TO PAY 
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY FROM THOSE 
RECEIVABLES THEREBY UNFAIRLY 
PROVIDING MRS. SORENSEN A DOUBLE 
RECOVERY 
Mrs. Sorensen argues that Dogu v. Dogu. 652 P.2d 13 08 (Utah 
1982) stands only for the proposition that the trial court did not 
abuse its decision in valuing Dr. Dogu's professional corporation. 
This argument might have merit were it not for this Court fs 
explicit statement in that case regarding Dr. Dogu's sole 
professional corporation's accounts receivable. 
In Doau, supra, the court not only affirmed the trial court's 
method of valuing the professional corporation but defined and 
elaborated on the issue of accounts receivable by specifically 
excluding those receivables and defining them as: 
. . . deferred income from which respondent may 
meet his ongoing alimony and child support 
obligations to appellant. 
Id. at 1309. 
Like Dr. Dogu, Dr. Sorensen was required to pay alimony and 
child support. Like Dr. Dogu, Dr. Sorensen should be able to use 
those receivables, if and when paid, to help him meet his ongoing 
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support obligations. In cases when there are no-going child 
support or alimony obligations, it may be appropriate exercise of 
discretion to treat accounts receivable as an asset in the overall 
property distribution. But in cases where there are on-going 
support obligations, treating accounts receivable as both an item 
of property to be distributed and a fund from which to pay support 
double charges the person who is to pay support and who is to 
receive the accounts receivable. It was error and not in keeping 
with the directive of Dogu, supra, to include the receivables as 
an asset to be awarded to Dr. Sorensen. By so doing, Mrs. Sorensen 
received a double benefit and got not only the egg but a piece of 
the goose that lays it. 
This inequitable result dramatizes the inherently flawed 
analogy comparing the valuation and distribution of a true business 
partnership upon dissolution to that of a solo professional 
practice upon divorce. Such an analogy is particularly flawed where 
there are on-going support obligations of the professional based 
upon anticipated income generated by him in his practice. 
Traditional accounting methods of valuating in such circumstances, 
including calculations valuing professional "goodwill" and accounts 
receivable, simply do not square with Utah's legal concepts of 
"equitable distribution" of property and support entitlements upon 
divorce. 
In Dogu, the accounts receivable were correctly excluded from 
the value of the Dr. Dogu's professional corporation. In this 
case, the receivables were included in the value of the 
professional corporation, however, Dr. Sorensenfs accounts 
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receivable reflect the income from which he is to pay his support 
awards. Consequently, those receivables were erroneously included 
as a marital "asset" improperly causing an unfair imbalance in the 
overall property distribution. 
The same issue was presented to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
in the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 254 N.W. 2d 201 (Wis. 1977), 
where a trial court's decision to exclude a physician's accounts 
receivable from consideration in the property distribution was 
found to be correct. In explaining its decision, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court stated: 
The trial court considered accounts 
receivable as the equivalent to salary. In 
considering the amount of alimony and support 
to be awarded, it looked to Dr. Johnson's 
salary and his ability to pay. It was not 
error to view the receivables as salary. If 
Dr. Johnson remained with the clinic, the 
receivables would be paid as salary. If they 
left, they would take the place of salary while 
he established his new practice. Because the 
receivables were viewed as salary, it would 
have been error to include them in the assets 
available for distribution. 
Id. at 201-202. 
Accounts receivable amount to nothing more than future income. 
Professional spouses such as Dr. Sorensen receive income when these 
accounts are paid. Inclusion of the accounts in the marital estate 
is equivalent to placing a non-professional spouse's future wages 
into the property formula. This treatment of accounts receivables 
results in the professional spouse receiving a much smaller portion 
of the tangible marital estate. 
This double penalty was recognized by the Docru court. The 
double penalty becomes even more inequitable where the accounts 
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receivable represent a significant portion of the property awarded 
to the professional spouse. Here, the trial court awarded Dr. 
Sorensen accounts receivable which amounted to over 20% of the 
value of his professional corporation which he was awarded as a 
part of his share of the marital estate. 
In failing to follow this Court's decision in Dogu, supra, the 
Courts below have provided Mrs. Sorensen the double benefit of 
receiving ongoing support awards based substantially on Dr. 
Sorensen's income (which includes accounts receivable as paid) and 
property values to offset the accounts receivable awarded to Dr. 
Sorensen - a "double-dip" for Mrs. Sorensen and a "double charge 
for Dr. Sorensen. 
By failing to follow the law established by this Court, the 
courts below have sanctioned an unfair result for Dr. Sorensen. 
Accordingly, this court should reverse the decision by the courts 
below and remand the matter for a fair reallocation of the 
remaining marital estate. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT 
DR. SORENSEN^ ACTUAL ACCOUNTS 
PAYABLE WERE CONSIDERED IN 
ESTABLISHING A VALUE TO HIS DENTAL 
PRACTICE 
Mrs. Sorensen contends, essentially, that the accounts payable 
of Dr. Sorensen's practice were included in the value ascribed to 
the practice by Mrs. Sorensen's expert witness because that witness 
examined Dr. Sorensen's average expenses and receipts over a three-
year period. Such an examination certainly cannot be considered 
as an examination of balances owing on accounts payable owed by Dr. 
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Sorensen's practice at trial. For example, an individual may have 
a recurring monthly debt service expense, but this expense has 
little or no relationship to the total debt balance outstanding 
which is a liability to be considered when determining net worth. 
The trial court accepted at face value the evidence of Respondent 
and her expert witness, Dr. Austin, and the figures set forth on 
Exhibit D in valuing Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. (See Exhibit 
"D" in the Addendum to Dr. Sorensen's main Brief) That estimate 
of value is inaccurate on its face because it fails to consider 
the fact, as established by Sorensen's accountants, that there were 
$10,129.00 in "hard" accounts payable which the dental practice 
owed (Vol. II, p. 23) Nowhere in the record or in that Exhibit D 
is it shown that these "hard" accounts payable were considered in 
arriving at the net value of to Dr. Sorensen's practice. To not 
have considered that liability in reaching a decision on the 
claimed net value of the dental practice was reversible error and 
created a further imbalance in the overall property distribution. 
Dr. Sorensen raised this error on appeal, but the Utah Court 
of Appeals held that if these "hard" payables were overlooked, then 
the error was simply "harmless." 
In State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), this Court held 
that: 
Errors we label as "harmless" are errors 
which, although properly preserved on appeal, 
are sufficiently inconsequential that we 
conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that 
the error affected the outcome of the 
proceeding. [Footnote citations omitted] 
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Courts in other states give essentially the same definition 
to "harmless error" does in Utah, See, e.g. State v. Kitchen, 730 
P.2d 103, 107 (Wash. App. 1986), where harmless error is defined 
as: 
. . . an error which is trivial, formal, 
or merely academic, was not prejudicial to the 
substantial rights of the defendant, and in no 
way affected the final outcome of the case. 
State v. Kitchen, 730, P.2d 103, 107 (Wash. 
App. 1986). 
While Verde and Kitchen involve criminal issues, the are they 
equally applicable to civil cases where substantial rights are 
infringed upon as in Sorensen this case where the final property 
settlement was unjust weighted in favor of Mrs. Sorensen. 
It stretches the imagination to fairly conclude that an error 
of over $10,000 in the valuation of the Sorensen's property is 
"harmless." In affirming on the accounts payable issue, the Court 
of Appeals rationalized and, in essence, concluded that even if 10% 
of the value of the dental practice had been overlooked ($100,000 
minus $10,129 accounts payable), that oversight was harmless. This 
is a clear case of the Utah Court of Appeals' attempting to avoid 
a reversal on the dental practice valuation issue. It cannot be 
sanctioned. To do so, creates a "harmless error" category into 
which almost any aspect of a trial court's decision can fall, 
should an appellate court chose to do so, and gives absolutely no 
guidance to trial courts and litigants as to what is or is not 
"harmless error." 
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals relating to the 
issue of accounts payable should be reversed by this Court, and 
15 
the matter should be remanded for a reallocation of the marital 
assets in accord with each of the property modifications requested 
by Dr. Sorensen in this appeal. 
POINT IV 
REGARDLESS OF HOW THE DETERMINATION 
REGARDING EXPERT WITNESS FEES IS 
CHARACTERIZED, IT WAS STILL ERRONEOUS AND 
CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW 
The Utah Supreme Court in Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1280 (Utah 
1980) held that it was improper for a trial court to require one 
party to pay the other party's expert witness fees related to 
preparation for and attendance at trial. In reversing the trial 
court's award of those fees characterized as costs/ the court 
remanded with instructions that the award be adjusted to eliminate 
any fees awarded above the statutory witness fee rate. Id. at 
1384. 
In Sorensen, the parties had acquired several pieces of real 
estate. Mr. Heiskenan, the expert whose fees are in question, 
appraised each property and testified on behalf of Mrs. Sorensen. 
Dr. Sorensen called his own appraisers to testify as to the value 
of the properties. In comparing the testimony of each appraiser 
with the ultimate decision of the trial court as to value, it is 
clear that all of Mr. Heiskenan's values were accepted by the trial 
court whereas none of the values presented by Dr. Sorensen's 
appraisers were utilized in the overall property distribution. It 
is also important to note that Mr. Heiskenanfs fees not only 
included fees related to preparing the appraisals but also fees 
related to his testimony at trial. 
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Respondent first argues that because Dr. Sorensen had 
previously agreed to advance the initial appraisal fee to Mr. 
Heiskenan during the pre-trial proceedings, with the ultimate 
decision as to responsibility for payment to be reserved for trial, 
then he is now somehow precluded from challenging the propriety of 
the trial court's order requiring him to pay a portion of those 
fees. The ultimate responsibility for the Heiskenen fees, however, 
was reserved for trial. Dr. Sorensen never agreed to assume 
responsibility for the fees. He expressly reserved ultimate 
responsibility for payment of those fees as an issue for trial (R. 
57-58) , and can in no way be said to have waived his rights to 
challenge an award of witness fees. 
Respondent next argues that the fees which Dr. Sorensen was 
ordered to pay are something akin to attorney's fees thereby giving 
the trial court discretion to make an award of the same. This 
argument is equally without merit and is in conflict with the law 
as set out in Kerr, supra, and Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 
(Utah 1980) . There, this court stated the general rule that costs 
are those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to 
witnesses and for which the statutes authorize to be included in 
the judgment. Id. at 774. Respondent cites no contrary authority 
and there is no basis upon which to analogize witness fees to 
attorney's fees. 
At the conclusion of the trial, Mrs. Sorensen requested that 
Dr. Sorensen pay all of her expert witness fees and in response to 
that request, the trial court ordered that: 
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. . . Each party shall pay their own experts 
with the exception of Allan Heiskenan which 
shall be shared equally. (Paragraph 23, Decree 
of Divorce; R. 96.) 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's award of 
expert witness fees in direct contradiction to the decision of this 
Court in Kerr where it was held that: 
This Court has recently held in the decision 
in Frampton v. Wilson [footnote], that expert 
witness fees may not be taxed as costs over and 
above the statutory rate [footnote]. We 
therefore remand to the trial court for an 
adjustment of the award. 
Id. at 138. 
Based on this principle, the only costs which could be assessed Dr. 
Sorensen would be the statutory rate of $14.00 per day, as provided 
in Section 21-5-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
The Court of Appeals erred in requiring Dr. Sorensen to pay 
one-half of these professional fees for expert services rendered 
and that portion of the Decree requiring Dr. Sorensen to pay one-
half of Mr. Heiskenan's expert witness fees should be vacated. 
RESPONSE TO ARGUMENTS ON CROSS PETITION 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE 
OF ATTORNEYS FEES WAS FATALLY 
DEFECTIVE; THEREFORE, THE COURT OF 
APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN REVERSING THE 
AWARD OF THE TRIAL COURT 
Section 30-3-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), provides a 
divorce court with the authority to award attorney's fees in 
divorce actions. However the law in Utah is clear that any such 
award must be supported by evidence that it is both reasonable in 
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amount and reasonably needed by the requesting party. Kerr v. Kerr 
610 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1980). 
While Mrs. Sorensen testified that she had incurred attorney's 
fees (Vol. I, p. 145), and wanted her husband to pay them because 
she presently had no income (Vol. I, p. 148), the only evidence 
presented to the trial court relative to the required element of 
reasonableness was the statement of account of Mrs. Sorensenfs 
counsel (Exhibit V), and the following exchange between the court 
and counsel at the close of Mrs. Sorensen!s case: 
MR. HEALY: Your Honor, we have also 
agreed that I would proffer to the court at 
this time the attorney fees and state what this 
is based on. 
THE COURT: Would you stipulate Mr. 
Echard, that if Mr. Healy were to testify, that 
he would testify that his fee in this matter 
is $3,587.50, in addition therewith some 
witness subpoena fees. The stipulation would 
not go to the question of whether or not they 
are reasonable or whether they should be 
awarded, but that would be his testimony. May 
it be so stipulated? 
MR. ECHARD: It may, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court would receive the 
stipulation for that purpose. Maybe we ought 
to have this marked, Mr. Healy marked as V. 
(Vol. I, p. 214.) 
There was also a second exchange between counsel and the court in 
relation to Mrs. Sorensen1s attorney's supplemental billing, 
Exhibit X, at the end of trial: 
MR. ECHARD: I agreed, Your Honor, that 
counsel could make a proffer as to attorney 
fees. I would not agree to it, but I would 
accept it as to what he would testify to with 
that. 
MR. HEALY: These are additional fees in 
connection with the further hearing. 
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THE COURT: That is Exhibit X, and the 
Court will accept that as a proffer of 
additional fees in this matter. (Whereupon, 
plaintiff's Exhibit X was received in 
evidence.) (Vol. II, p. 171.) 
There was no other evidence presented to the court on 
attorney's fees. As such, that evidence was not sufficient to 
fulfill the requirements set out in Talley v. Talley, 739 p.,2d 83, 
84 (Utah App. 1987), that: 
"In divorce cases, an award of attorney 
fees must be supported by evidence that it is 
reasonable in amount and reasonably needed by 
the party requesting the award." Huck v. Huck, 
734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986). Although 
plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated reasonable 
financial need, she failed to present evidence 
of the reasonableness of the fee requested. 
At the close of plaintiff's case, her counsel 
proffered testimony and produced an exhibit 
itemizing the time and costs expended by him, 
his associates, and his clerk, and the hourly 
rates charged for each. Conspicuously absent 
is any evidence "regarding the necessity of the 
number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness 
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty 
of the case and the result accomplished, and 
the rates commonly charged for divorce actions 
in the community ..." Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 
1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980). 
Because plaintiff failed in her burden of 
establishing the reasonableness of the attorney 
fees requested, we reverse the award of 
attorney fees. Beals v. Beals, 682 P. 2d 862 
(Utah 1984); Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27 
(Utah 1984). Id. at 32. 
Likewise, conspicuously absent in this case is any evidence 
regarding the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the 
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of 
the case and the result accomplished and the rates commonly charged 
for divorce actions in the community. This required evidence as 
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to the reasonableness of Mrs. Sorensen's attorney's fee was totally 
lacking at trial. Further, the record is devoid of any testimony, 
direct or proffered, which related to the necessity of the number 
of hours dedicated, the reasonableness of the rate charged in light 
of the difficulty of the case and the result accomplished, and the 
rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community. 
Parenthetically, there is also no finding of fact or reference 
in the trial court's ruling related to the evidence required to 
support an award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen. 
Even assuming arguendo that this evidence is not specifically 
necessary, the proffer which was presented was still defective on 
the general question of reasonableness of the requested fee. The 
stipulation as to the proffer went only to the amount of Mr. 
Healy's fees as reflected on the proposed Exhibit V and X. The 
stipulation specifically excluded the question of the 
reasonableness of the requested fee, as the interchange between the 
Court and counsel clearly shows (See Vol. I, p. 214 and Vol. II P. 
171) . In view of these evidentiary deficiencies and the law in 
Utah as articulated in Talley, supra, the Court of Appeals' 
decision reversing any award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen 
was entirely correct. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY 
EXERCISED THEIR DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MRS. SORENSEN'S REQUEST FOR AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
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RESPONDENT•S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES WAS 
UNTIMELY 
Plaintiff's request for fees on appeal was not properly raised 
nor briefed and was untimely. The only reference to her request 
for attorney's fees on appeal is found in her four-line conclusion 
on page 24 of her Responsive brief filed with the Utah Court of 
Appeals where she states: 
Mrs, Sorensen asks this Court (i) to affirm the 
decision of the district court; (ii) to award 
her the costs she has incurred on appeal; and 
(iii) to award her attorney's fees for 
defending this appeal. 
Nowhere in her brief to the Court of Appeals does she argue the 
matter or delineate it as an issue on appeal. Having failed to 
properly raise and argue the issue before the Court of Appeals she 
should not be entitled to do so now. 
&. 
RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO 
DEMONSTRATE A NEED FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
An award of attorney's fees in a divorce action, whether at 
trial or on appeal, must be based on evidence showing both 
reasonableness of the need and of the amount unless the appeal is 
frivolous or without merit. See Kerr v. Kerr, supra, and Talley 
v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1988). Mrs. Sorensen has failed 
to demonstrate her need in either regard. She was awarded alimony, 
child support and approximately $131,000 in assets from the 
marriage as acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in Sorensen v. 
Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989) at 831. 
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RESPONDENT• S REQUEST FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
INAPPROPRIATE AND CONTRARY 
IS TO UTAH LAW 
Attorney's fees on appeal are granted only in the discretion 
of the court in conformance with statute or rule. Mauahn v. 
Maughn, 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). They are generally awarded 
an appeal only where the appeal is shown to be frivolous or without 
merit. See e.g., Ehnincrer v. Ehninger, 569 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977). 
Moreover, where an appeal results in a partial reversal, as in this 
case, then an appeal is meritorious and an award of attorney's fees 
on appeal is improper. Workman v. Workman, 652 P. 2d 931 (Utah 
1982) . 
An award of attorney's fees in the case now before this Court 
would be particularly inappropriate, unfair and chilling to the 
rights of the citizens of this state in seeking legal relief and 
redress. The issues presented to the Utah Court of Appeals, and 
now to this Court, involve important questions of State law and a 
departure from current Utah case law. An award of attorney's fees 
against the Petitioner/Appellant/Defendant who has relied upon 
current Utah law governing the issues related to the appeal would 
be unfair and oppressive. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The majority opinion in the Utah Court of Appeals in Sorensen 
is substantively erroneous in five respects and did not follow 
existing Utah law as established by this Court and the Utah State 
Legislature in at least four instances: 
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1. Under Utah law, goodwill of a professional solo practice 
is not an element of value subject to distribution as marital 
property as is set forth in the Jackson and Stevens cases, supra; 
2. Premarital property is not subject to distribution as 
marital property absent extraordinary circumstances not existing 
in this case, as is set forth in Preston, supra; 
3. Accounts receivable are deferred income not subject to 
distribution as marital property, as is set forth in Dgcju, supra, 
and to distribute accounts receivable as a marital asset when those 
receivables are relied upon to meet support obligations results in 
a "double dip" to the recipient and a double charge to the payor; 
4. Accounts payable must be included in the valuation 
process distributing the marital estate; and 
5. A litigant's expert witness fees are not costs taxable 
to the opposing party beyond the statutory rate as set forth in 
Frampton and Kerr cases and Section 21-5-4 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as 
amended). 
In all five instances, the decision by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Sorensen upholding the ruling of the trial court are 
contrary to those of this court and must, therefore, be reversed. 
The assignment of value to professional goodwill and accounts 
receivable as marital property should be vacated. Dr. Sorensen1s 
accounts payable should be deducted from the value of the marital 
property and the Heiskenan expert witness fees should be vacated. 
The trial court should then be instructed to modify the overall 
property distribution consistent with those adjustments and then 
to reallocate the remaining marital property to achieve parity 
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between the parties. 
The Court of Appeals was entirely correct in reversing the 
trial court award of attorney's fees to Mrs. Sorensen where she 
failed to present evidence sufficient to establish the 
reasonableness of her attorney's fees as is required in Talley, 
supra. Further, the Court of Appeals properly exercised its 
discretion under the circumstances in denying Mrs. Sorensen her 
attorney's fees on appeal. 
Dr. Sorensen should be awarded his costs related to this 
appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this / ^ day of March, 1990. 
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